Two jurisdictions with near-identical statutes can produce very different results. The usual explanation is not the text but the resources available to the body enforcing it.
Enforcement capacity is finite and allocated
Regulators operate with a fixed number of inspectors, investigators and lawyers, and every case consumes a share of that capacity.
Where the regulated population is large relative to staffing, most entities will never be examined, and compliance depends on the perceived probability of attention.
Budgets are set through appropriations that can change annually, so enforcement intensity can shift without any amendment to the law itself.
Detection is the binding constraint
Most breaches are not self-evident. Detecting them requires inspection, data analysis or a complaint from someone who knows what happened.
Complaint-driven enforcement concentrates attention where people know their rights and are willing to come forward, which is unevenly distributed.
Proactive inspection reaches situations no one reports, but it is more expensive per case and less visibly responsive, so it is often reduced first.
Penalty design changes the calculation
Where a penalty is smaller than the gain from non-compliance, paying it becomes a cost of doing business rather than a deterrent.
Penalties tied to turnover or to the benefit obtained scale with the entity, which addresses this, though they require more evidence to calculate.
Deterrence depends on the penalty multiplied by the chance of being caught, so weak detection undermines even a severe penalty regime.
Remedies that require restoring the position of affected people, rather than paying a fine to the state, also change behaviour differently, since the cost scales with the number harmed.
Priorities are set within the agency
With limited capacity, regulators publish enforcement priorities identifying sectors or conduct they will focus on, which is a policy decision made administratively.
Those priorities respond to political direction, public attention and litigation risk, and they can change substantially when leadership changes.
Areas outside the stated priorities remain unlawful but effectively unenforced, which is a distinction that rarely appears in descriptions of the law.
Private enforcement fills part of the gap
Some statutes allow individuals to sue directly, which adds enforcement capacity funded privately rather than through appropriations.
Whether that route functions depends on cost rules, availability of representation and whether claims can be grouped, since individual claims are often uneconomic.
Because appropriations, penalty structures and private rights of action are set separately in each jurisdiction and revised regularly, enforcement reality must be assessed locally.